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STANDARD
ROLE SPECIFICATIONS
AND DEFAULT-BASED
PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
XIAOYU LIN
Premarital Agreements based on three standardized, or default, role specifications will help solve post-divorce financial inequalities created by current
interpretations of no-fault divorce laws.

M

arriage is a contract in terms of the agreed upon long-term
mutual commitment and the expected joint benefits from
the relationship. Not only do spouses anticipate that marriage will provide companionship and the joys and fulfillment of child
rearing, but they also expect it to secure their respective emotional and
economic investments.1 Traditional fault divorce law chose to protect
these investments through prescriptions on proper marital behaviors of
each party, an approach that often led to hostility and unpredictable
results. Seeking to avoid these problems, laws since 1969 have generally utilized no-fault considerations to regulate economic decisions
in divorce.
Despite this proper focus, however, laws based on no-fault principles have repeatedly failed to properly interpret key elements in a
couple’s economic partnership. Most notably, these laws have partially
or completely neglected to take into account a domestic spouse’s many
investments in the well-being of his or her children and in the careerenhancement of the other spouse. Investments into these areas, called
human capital by economists, have significant economic value and
deserve more careful consideration. Unless this occurs, current no-fault

42 / BYU Prelaw Review

interpretations and nonsystematic premarital agreement practices will
continue to facilitate opportunistic marital defections and disproportional burdens on homemakers.
One way to ensure economically equitable divorce decisions is to
implement a system of standard role specifications. Based on an analysis
of the partnership aspects of marriage contract, it seems that using three
general standards, or default modes, of role specifications to guide court
and other decisions would minimize current problems. Not only would
these three default modes serve as guideposts for the courts, but they
would make it easier for potential spouses to customize premarital agreements in areas such as property division, alimony, and child custody
arrangements and support. This approach should better protect the
economic investments of the domestic spouse should divorce occur.

Partership and Human Capital
The contractual nature of marriage contract signals a dual partnership for the parties in cases where there are children. In the production
of human capital (the bearing and rearing of children), the parties are
equal partners and marriage between them is a joint agreement.2 Each
spouse is equally responsible for feeding, nurturing, and educating their
children; and both expect to enjoy the benefits of parenting. In terms
of the human capital of each party, however, marriage can be an
unequal partnership, especially where one spouse serves a primarily domestic role. Role specification within marriage usually means that one
spouse must sacrifice his or her own career opportunities to enhance
the human capital of the other spouse.
Although the career-enhancement of the nondomestic spouse is
mostly due to “educational institutions and on-the-job training,”3 the
domestic spouse invests considerable time and effort to facilitate this
option. As a result, the helping spouse has valid claims on compensation for his or her diminished or lost career opportunities. In this sense,
post divorce spousal support might be understood as “legal enforcement of insurance payments” in return for the “substantial marriagespecific investment” undertaken by the domestic spouse.4
Similar instances of reduced human capital appear in situations
where both spouses work but one chooses to work less in order to fulfill
domestic or other responsibilities or interests. Even where both spouses
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work full-time, research has shown that one spouse (usually the
woman) will earn substantially less, again primarily because of domestic
responsibilities. All of this points to the need for legal safeguards
against post-divorce financial inequalities. One such safeguard is the
premarital agreement.

Premarital Agreement
Properly constructed premarital agreements can offer an effective
avenue of security for couples seeking to protect themselves from
potential post-divorce economic problems. Premarital agreement (often
called prenuptial contract) is a way to reinstate legally the seriousness
and commitment that a marriage relationship signals. Prospective
couples that decide their own terms of marital contract regarding
shared goals, labor division, and financial arrangements enjoy two main
benefits. First, they are more motivated to invest emotionally in the
relationship. Second, they have a more effective means of settling financial arrangements and/or disputes in case of divorce. The fact that premarital agreements are legally binding and enforceable decreases the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior on the part of either spouse.5
The concept of premarital agreement is not new. Couples for
centuries, especially celebrities, have chosen to form agreements with
one another before marriage. However, in terms of whether premarital
agreements are an effective way to solve current problems, contemporary theorists have differed in their views. Lloyd Cohen, for example,
argues that current forms of premarital agreements do not adequately
address the needs of those most needing them. Because these forms
deal mostly with nontraditional instances of divorce (such as protection
of several valuable assets), spouses in traditional marriages where
divorce costs are most difficult to estimate are left without effective
recourse. Based on these difficulties, Cohen believes that premarital
agreements are ineffective in traditional marriages.6
Because of the above problems, theorists Elizabeth and Robert
Scott assert that traditional marriages would be better served by replacing premarital contract with a device they call a “relational contract.”7
This contract, they believe, would legally reinforce marriage vows by
including considerations of several important aspects of the relationship. Although Scott and Scott correctly refute Cohen by showing how
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at least the concept of premarital agreement can still function, they fail
to create any concrete role specifications that would serve as defaults, or
models, in constructing the type of contracts they propose.
The primary advantage to creating default modes is that they provide traditional couples with an efficient way to customize premarital
contracts. A second advantage is that traditional spouses can rely on
more effective premarital contracts to better protect their economic
investments in the relationship.

Default Modes and Applications
Role specification is likely the most important factor in the development of default modes. Based on the most common types of role
specifications, three default modes emerge as those best suited for standardized application. The first mode is that of the traditional marriage,
in which one spouse serves as the sole breadwinner and the other
assumes a solely domestic role. In the second mode, both spouses bring
income to the family but one of them exerts more effort in domestic responsibilities, resulting in unequal financial contributions to the family.
The third mode consists of two spouses with a combined income high
enough for them to continue working while they rely on a third party
to perform domestic duties.
To illustrate how these default modes might practically function, it
may be useful to provide a few limited examples of divorce proceedings
arising under each mode. In the third mode, current no-fault considerations may be safely utilized because these decisions are, as a rule, based
on property division. If both spouses own similarly valued assets, equitable economic distribution is likely. When children are involved the law
should mandate a minimum economic obligation of each parent. The
main goal should be to ensure that the child’s (or children’s) standard of
living will remain reasonably similar to what it was before the divorce.
For divorce cases arising under the first and second modes, and
where children are not involved, modern no-fault considerations
generally do not require alimony payments to the economically weaker
spouse. The reason for this, correct or not, is due to the expectation
that the spouse has the ability and the opportunity to secure gainful
employment. However, if a spouse has forgone education or job
training opportunities to support the career-enhancement of the other
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spouse, he or she should be able to claim compensation for lost human
capital. One way to address this need is through repayment of the
domestic spouse’s contribution. Such a contribution could best be determined by a legal analysis of the premarital agreement. Of course,
authorities would need to take into account the length of the marriage.
If divorce occurs under the first and second modes, and the couple
has children, the best way to determine custody rights is to analyze the
level of each spouse’s involvement with each child. According to Scott
and Scott, custody rights should be “proportional to each party’s investment in the relationship with the children prior to divorce, and each
party [should] continue to invest at that [same] level afterward.”8
Because marriage usually diminishes human capital for domestic
spouses in the first and second modes, if there are children involved the
nondomestic spouse should be responsible for the majority of each
child’s living and educational expenses. Moreover, the domestic spouse
should receive monetary support if he or she stayed at home full-time
or received minimal remuneration due to domestic obligations. In
either case, barring remarriage, the domestic spouse should receive
spousal support that includes assistance with living and job training
expenses for a set period of time, based on the length of the marriage.
For instance, ten years of marriage justifies ten years of financial support. If the duration of the marriage spans a period long enough that
the domestic spouse has permanently lost a career opportunity, the law
should consider the possibility of awarding alimony for the remainder
of the domestic spouse’s life.9

Conclusion
To help remedy the ills of some current no-fault divorce practices,
future laws would do well to more carefully consider the economic factors in divorce proceedings. This is especially true in cases where one
spouse sacrifices career opportunities to take care of children or enhance the career of the other spouse. One effective way to address the
situation is through the use of premarital contracts based on three standardized role specifications, or default modes. Customizing premarital
contracts based on these default modes will not only serve to guide
court decisions, but will protect rather than punish those couples who
choose to form families.
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